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The Role of Penetration Testing 




Digital forensic investigators are faced with multimedia retrieval and discovery 
challenges that require innovation and application of evolving methodologies. This 
work is made more difficult in critical infra-structure environments where the 
acquired evidence is in many formats, types and presentations. Penetration testing 
is one of the techniques used to focus an investigation and to target the potential 
case information from the vulnerability identification phase, through to the media 
identification phase. In this chapter a review of these processes is made and a 
framework example developed to show how the investigator discovers relevant 
evidence. The problem for the digital investigator is the vast array of media in 
which evidence is stored or transmitted. Some work is from live retrieval and others 
static. A framework of methods that is flexible and adaptable to the context of 
investigation is proposed and the discovery methods for multimedia environments 
elaborated.
Keywords: penetration testing, digital forensics, critical infrastructures,  
evidence extraction, process framework
1. Introduction
Forensic Investigators conduct forensic examinations in order to identify 
evidence and to prevent future compromises of a system. The increasing volume 
of digital data to be managed and the diversity of media type is a contemporary 
challenge. The diversity of devices, operating systems, media and services pres-
ent obstacles that require solution for efficient and effective professional practice. 
The variety of data sources, formats and styles poses a multimedia problem that 
requires working solutions for information access and content documentation. 
The acquired evidence can include different types of forensic data such as pictures, 
audios, videos, files, directories, and texts [1]. The systems for extraction are either 
live and functioning or static and stored. In either situation due processes, methods, 
standards and guidelines must be complied to achieve a repeatable practice for 
later auditing. In many instances copies are taken of the various media so analysis 
proceeds on identical images and not the original media. Investigation processes 
are segregated into phases to assure the best deployment of specialist skills and the 
preservation of the evidence [2]. Segregation is usually divided into preparation, 
acquisition, analysis, and reporting phases and sequenced towards a deliverable 
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that provides corrective actions [3]. In such a situation the system of work and 
the targeting of the work objectives are critical to the deliverable and the viability 
of an investigation. In this Chapter we derive a framework for investigation in an 
intensive multimedia environment and then demonstrate the targeting power of 
penetration testing techniques.
Critical infrastructures (CI) involve complex systems for the control and protec-
tion of assets, and the production and distribution of services to detect suspicious 
activities [4]. Any unplanned disturbance to these facilities seriously affects the 
quality of life and economic wellbeing of humans. Modern society depends on digi-
tal infrastructures to provide their management of services and the fair and timely 
distribution. For example, one day of disrupted power supply to a region of users 
stops work of all kinds and prevents the usual activities that support daily living 
[5]. Extended power failure causes long-term destruction of economic relationships 
and negatively affects the necessities for daily life. These systems require protec-
tion and one of the ways to do this is to use forensic investigation of events, and to 
do penetration testing before anything unplanned occurs [6]. In addition to other 
security provisions, forensic techniques are commonly implemented to document 
baseline configurations in order to detect abnormal activities, such as unauthorized 
access into network infrastructure. However, the challenge is to gain a fair estima-
tion of the data provisions in the systems that are chaotically fill of large volumes of 
static and live data, and a full range of multimedia data types [7].
In this research we designed and tested an investigation framework for mul-
timedia data types to address the challenges of evidence collection in CIs. The 
volume and complexity issues influence the evidence collection phase but also 
each environment has unique features from organizational cultures, administra-
tion designs, recovery tools, record structures, logging systems, and general usage 
patterns that all impact the scope and success of an investigation [8]. In addition, 
there are further challenges such as automation, volatility of data, and data min-
gling. Automation creates key information resources in order to handle the data 
and abstract data from its context. Volatility makes the process of collecting data 
difficult because the data within the collection process is removed, deleted, or over-
written [9]. Furthermore, Data Mingling is a serious problem of data mixing and 
the types being indistinguishable. Often, the sample of total data investigated in the 
forensic process comprises of both data related to the incident and data unrelated to 
the incident [10]. Forensic investigators require help to make sense of the complex 
multimedia contexts in which they have to work. An investigation framework 
that is responsive to CI complexities and has targeting features to make workloads 
manageable is required. The following sections describe how these requirements are 
designed and become functional in an investigation process.
2. Background literature
Industrial Control Systems in critical infrastructures support monitoring, 
administering, and controlling essential services. Therefore, by design architecture, 
components, and environments in CI, allow forensic capabilities to be implemented 
and to further mitigate the potential risk of security failure. Industrial Control 
System Architecture is deployed based on Service Oriented Architecture [11]. Hence, 
three different designs are found according to the architecture of the system. First, 
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems apply central admin-
istration by using a central computer to communicate remotely through a Remote 
Terminal Unit (RTU). A Human Machine Interface (HCI) is linked to SCADA and 
facilitates the process of displaying, and monitoring processes. The typical uses 
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for SCADA are in natural gas, electricity, and water distribution [12]. Second, 
Distributed Control Systems (DCS) distribute processes that have been controlled to 
devices for execution [13]. The typical uses of DCS are in manufacturing, chemical 
and electric power plants. Third, Non-Centralised System design allows for a number 
of control systems that do not require centralised administration. Accordingly, 
Programmable Logic Controllers (PLC) or any other control devices can be imple-
mented and configured as a combination of Control System, Data Historian and 
Human Machine Interface [13]. This type of configuration is usually designed for 
manufacturing processes.
The distribution of media type is found spread evenly through the layers of an 
industrial control system for CI [14]. These layers are often described as starting 
at layer 0 where the sensors of the system and primitive data are found, through to 
layer 4 which is the enterprise level where the business applications and rich media 
reside [15]. In Table 1 these layers and media types are described and elaborated 
to identify the data types and the diversity of media type a digital investigator 
must review in discovery processes. Discovery processes hence require extreme 
multimedia processing capabilities that can span the scope of data type and format 
found in a CI environment. This requires critical tool selection and the designing of 
staged and sequenced tool use for comprehensive discovery. The task is difficult and 
is challenged by the constant innovation and adoption of new data type and struc-
tures that come with new versions of software and new applications. The multime-
dia processing capability an investigator chooses reflects the design and scope of an 
investigation, and the professional capacity to adapt and acquire the necessary tools 
and techniques [16, 17].
3. Designing a framework
Primarily an investigator requires a systematized process framework to effec-
tively guide an investigation through the known and unknown media types found 
in a CI investigation. The design proceeds through a phased approach outlined in 
Figure 1. A digital forensic investigation in engineering workstations or control 
rooms in CIs includes all electronic devices that are interconnected with each other 
for sending/receiving messages or two-way communications, such as, mobile 
phones, laptops, computers, tablets, PDAs, programmable logic controllers, human 
machine interfaces, and supervisory control and data acquisition systems [16]. 
These systems and devices have their own storage systems. Either physical storage 
systems or virtual technologies such as cloud computing for logging all activities, 
incidents, and events [18–21]. Conducting a forensic investigation on engineering 
Level Information System Media Type
0 Sensor Networks, Internet of Things, and so on Data, streams of text and digits
1 Programmable Logic Controller, Picture 
Archiving and Communication
Structured data, text, frames, objects
2 Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition Ladder logics, objects, words, text and 
digits
3 Management Expert and Management 
Information Systems
Images, videos, text, files, directories
4 Enterprise Resource Planning Files, directories, all manner of media type
Table 1. 
CI Media types at organization levels.
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workstations and applying physical and remote data acquisition will discover 
evidence in the different media that can be used for legal, employment, and other 
purposes [22]. In this type of investigation, physical and remote data acquisition 
are an advantage, and hence the investigation equipment must have the capacity to 
manage volumes, data complexities and multimedia types.
Each investigation requires phases that develop the focus for evidence collection 
and then pass the findings to the next phase for further refinement. Planning and 
Identification is a starting point for a structured investigation. At this stage, the 
incident has to be verified in order to collect fact sheets and plan for a capability 
handling strategy for the particular case. The major objective of this phase is to 
boost the productivity of gathering the necessary information about the incident 
and facilitate the process of data acquisition [23]. Critically the acceptance of 
multimedia types by the acquisition tools allows credibility to be established 
and documented against the brief scope. If media types cannot be collected then 
the performance and adequacy of the investigation are brought into question. 
Furthermore, obtaining authorizations and authentications are also compulsory, 
when the case needs an authorized access to the system for media acquisition. 
System settings are one of most important facts required to be obtained by inves-
tigators for determining the device’s system state when the incident occurred. 
System settings can include the system specifications of all machines that are under 
investigation, and the time or date. Moreover, conducting a network reconnais-
sance is the last step to obtain IP addresses of all machines and their mac addresses 
and any other information that could lead to personal ownership identifica-
tion or related activities [23]. At each of the context levels in Table 1 different 
evidence is located and each data and media type must be accommodated in the 
 framework design.
The search and data collection stage employs discovery techniques that allow all 
information in the multiplicity of media types present to be collected. The investi-
gation process requires detailed information about the daily events for the users in 
the systems and machines or devices. All information that is collected, will be taken 
into consideration and preserved for relevancy determination. The collected data 
goes in to a complex process to determine whether the data acquired is compliant 
to evidentiary standards and the acquisition process and the deliverable are repro-
ducible by others. If the data is admissible, then it will go to further analysis for 
case relevancy and positioning in the data log. If not, the data will be stored for a 
specific period of time and reserved for analysis later when the circumstances may 
have changed. This stage aims to prepare all potential credible data to go through 
a parsing process, which is a more detailed analysis and sieving of the data. All 
necessary data is available to construct and to reconstruct a walkthrough of the 
control room.
A penetration testing phase is useful to target and to identify weaknesses in the 
system under investigation [24]. It is conducted remotely for acquiring live data 
on the system often when the users have not been formally informed that their 
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preserving live data before the digital evidence gets damaged or corrupted. The aim 
of this step is to combat the anti-forensic tools used by advanced persistent threat 
(APT) attackers and professional hackers in critical infrastructures [26]. Dead or 
static acquisition will be confirmed as the second step when relevant evidence is 
found. At this step, screenshots can be taken as a credible evidence of weaknesses 
and potential vulnerabilities to the work system.
The data examination stage features methodical assessment of all data, fact 
sheets, system settings, parsed data, data that came from the initial assessment, 
and media. Further processes of data analysis and examination also assure each 
media type is correctly processed and tools are found to process any irregular 
types. Timeline analysis and other perspectives allow systematic categorization 
and documentation of the relevant elements of information for the case [27]. This 
is a vital stage and beneficial as it comprises evidence history such as what time 
the files have been accessed, modified, created and changed, in a clear format that 
humans can understand. The data is collected using a diversity of applications 
and is released from the layer of metadata from the file system regardless of the 
operating system or format, and then analyzed. The timeline is fixed and applica-
tion data reconstructed if required as a part of the data analysis and examination. 
Media and artefact analyses is addressed by, for example, what applications have 
been executed, which archives have been opened or downloaded, which documents 
have been clicked on, which records were checked, which files were deleted, where 
did the user browse, and many other properties. Another type of analysis, which 
is necessary for finding indirect paths of information is at the signature level. This 
analysis is where forensic investigators implement techniques and practices that will 
search for byte signatures of known folders, files and regular expressions that lead 
to the cookies. Link analysis is employed to find the relationships and trusted links 
to other entities, servers, domains, email, images, audio, people, and other relevant 
objects that can be traced to identify all possible communications [28].
Finally reporting and presentation is the stage that contains reporting the 
results of the analysis and then presenting it to requested recipients. This step 
includes stating potential risks, clarifying the actions taken, specifying what other 
arrangements are required for completion; also suggestions for enhancing proce-
dures, guidelines, policies, applications, and other aspects of the forensic process 
investigations required in the target infrastructure [29]. This step is essential as it 
is important for the stakeholders in order to determine what strategies they must 
think about for future preparation. It includes a capability statement with respect 
to the investigation ability to process all multimedia formats or otherwise. The 
report has to be formulated in a form that is acceptable to the court or for any legal, 
employment or administrative purpose.
4. The framework
Digital forensic investigation frameworks have typically been developed for spe-
cialist areas of investigation by selecting standardized and repeatable process steps. 
In the former section we have described such phased steps for the generation of an 
investigation guideline for CI. However, what has yet to be addressed is the unique 
system and architectures of CI designs. A CI divides into work stations and control 
rooms. These are the two areas in which evidence must be collected by an investiga-
tor. The workstations interface at each of the CI levels described in Section 2 and 
Table 1 and carry live data and stored data that can include volatile components 
such as RAMs and Flash memory. The digital investigator has to strategically plan 
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for the full range of devices and media types, and to tactically deploy capability 
to act effectively and efficiently in these environments. The digital investigator is 
also faced with enormous volumes of data and not just the variability of formats. 
To cope with volumes our modelling proposes deployment of Hadoop architectures 
to manage the big data volumes, and the selection of relevant evidences. Figure 2 
is designed to include these features and to deliver sufficient guidance to a digital 
investigator that they can manage the challenges of a CI environment. The frame-
work provides control of the investigation from the five central phases where each 
phase appropriately connects to the big data issues on the right, and the workstation 
and control room issues on the left.
4.1 The five phases of investigation
The framework design centers the five phases of digital investigation between 
the two challenges in the CI environment – the media complexity and the data 
volumes. An investigator proceeds through the five phases described in Section 
3 to assure completion and compliance with standardized procedures. The sys-
tematic and sequenced approach allows concentration on the system in focus and 
the completion of the professional activities associated. The investigator has the 
deliverable and the budget in mind at all times. Different types of evidence require 
different treatment and handling while data format and media type determine 
adequate access for imaging. By staging the investigation phases in the center of 
the framework the work system is established and the challenges of the environ-
ment are managed, phase by phase. On the left hand side the complexities of the 
CI workstation context and on the right hand side the strategy for managing large 
data quantities, are specified. The investigator can hence branch left and right to 
effectively acquire evidence, while maintaining the phased requirements for due 
processes.
Figure 2. 
A CI Investigation Framework.
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4.2 Workstation and control room investigation
The workstations and control rooms context requires structured and planned 
entry. The control for investigation comes from the central digital investigation 
phases and the management constraints. At any step acquired evidence can include 
different types of forensic data such as pictures, audios, videos, text, files, directo-
ries, and so on. The multi layered challenge of the environment has to be addressed 
by strategy and tools that have proven effectiveness for data identification, time 
matching, multi-tenancy acquisition, data ownership differentiation, live forensic 
acquisition, privacy and privilege compliance, operating systems variation, media 
variation, format variations, and cloud compatibility. Sophisticated tools such as 
those that copy processes, examine evidence, analyze programs for generating 
checksums in order to complete the verification may not fit perfectly to some of 
control systems technologies. Control system technologies are also time stamped by 
the history of the system emergence and some data formats and operating systems 
may not be current. Consequently, many digital forensic tools demonstrate limited 
scope and require careful matching and mapping to the CI contexts to assure 
compatibility and effectiveness.
Importantly penetration tests are featured for the workstations and control 
rooms between the ‘Search & Data Collection’, and the ‘Initial Assessment’ phases. 
The penetration tests can confirm and limited the scope of further investigation. 
They can also provide vulnerability clues that redeploy of the ‘Search & Data 
Collection’ is done again for efficient targeting of areas for further investigation. 
This is a core component any CI forensic investigation. The major function of each 
one of these core components is to make sure that environments have correctly 
disclosed all the media for collection, and assurance is gained that complete analysis 
may proceed. The overall performance of an investigation will be limited unless the 
CI environmental and context variations can are fully addressed.
4.3 Big data investigation
The Hadoop context requires structured and planned entry for execution. The 
control for investigation comes from the central digital investigation phases and 
the management constraints. At any step acquired evidence can include different 
types of forensic data but the strategy is to organize the data into category and class 
nodes, and also data nodes. This organization and technical capability structures 
the data fields to optimize access at each phase of the central investigation plan. 
Live and dead nodes are discovered in a Hadoop architecture. They both contribute 
the necessary information needed to complete the digital forensic investigation 
on big data volumes. Nodes information is identified based on the different levels 
described in Table 1, such as node name with port number and IP address, last 
contact, admin state and additional information related to the data management 
and storage time and structure features. The scope includes all the logs created and 
stored on the cluster which contain the log files of data nodes, name nodes, second-
ary name nodes, the history server, user logs, the node manager, and the resource 
manager for all nodes. These files are vital for the process of hypotheses examina-
tion. To examine the Hadoop cluster, multimedia data acquisition techniques are 
used for the search and data collection. Data acquisition comes as a bit-by-bit copy 
of the content such as journal status, storage, log files, images, directories and 
logical database objects. The forensic examination is conducted through extracting 
system and nodes information using a range of proprietary and open source tools 
that are all selected and customized for the media type and performance. In this 
way the investigation phases can be executed in the big data context.
Multimedia Information Retrieval
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5. Penetration testing targeting
Cost efficiency is a critical factor in any digital investigation. Many elements, 
such as complexity and data volumes, hinder the efficient completion of investiga-
tion in CI environments. Consequently, strategies have to be employed to speed the 
completion without compromising the integrity of an investigation. Penetration 
testing is one such strategy. It is usually controlled and handled by penetration 
testers or qualified auditors and security specialists who are contracted in to scope 
the system and to identify useful investigation targets before the formal investiga-
tion proceeds. A penetration test seeks out the vulnerabilities of the system that 
an attacker could exploit, and where the system weaknesses are located. Such tests 
are performed from inside and outside the CI network infrastructure in order to 
test the overall performance of the network. The tests also determine the security 
level by categorizing the potential risks from high to low on the different interfaces. 
CI systems are a combination of applications interconnected to the control plane 
by network, hosts or branch networks. Penetration testing is a simulation process 
where real world attacks are made on potential targets to simulate the scope of 
hackers, attackers and other intruders. Penetration testing is also a valuable step 
towards developing a secure system that has assessed and mitigated potential 
vulnerabilities.
A basic penetration test may involve scanning for hosts’ IP addresses in the 
network in order to check whether they are offering services with known vulner-
abilities or hidden vulnerabilities that may be used in exploitation processes. The 
process would then extend to scanning ports for each host in the network and 
identifying unwanted opened ports that could be used as a gateway to the system. 
After following the penetration test plan the findings are reviewed and documented 
to be sent to stakeholders and investigators for action.
The objectives for penetration testing are [29, 30]:
• Preparing for the most effective starting test targets;
• Identification of security risks;
• Improving the performance of security systems;
• Prepare before an event occurs to prevent it; and,
• Reduce critical situations and potential crisis.
Important matters that come into consideration for planning CI penetration 
testing are aspects such as the scope, the intensity, the approach, the implementa-
tion techniques, and where to start. Each of these considerations will now be 
reviewed. The scope of the penetration test considers which systems and the degree 
to which each system will be tested. The cost may be reduced and complexity of the 
solution by limiting the extent of the testing in three categories:
• By performing Full penetration testing, the test will examine the overall 
performance and system safety policies of the target system.
• By performing Limited penetration testing, the access will include specific 
parts of the systems such as systems that are suspected hosts instead of testing 
the whole system.
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• By performing Focused testing, where either one part of the system is tested or 
one service of the systems. The approach will provide only information about 
the test part not general information about the overall system security status.
The intensity of penetration testing is determined by the urgency of the 
 situation. The urgency is measured by risk and is categorized into four metrics:
• Aggressive, is the highest level of penetration testing which generates a vast 
amount of network traffic about the infrastructure. The penetration tester 
tries to exploit all possible vulnerabilities in the system to identify whether 
the system is infected or secured. Some examples of aggressive attacks could 
be used in penetration testing such as Denial of Service attacks and buffer 
overflows. Calculated, cautious, and passive techniques are employed to get the 
best results. Covert and overt approaches are also used to sequence information 
gathering, and to achieve a comprehensive overview of a system. Different 
implementation techniques are also applied that differentiate characteristics 
of penetration tests and customize for the CI environment. The best approach, 
the motivation, and the important considerations when developing the optimal 
methodology and plan require sensitizing to the CI challenges. The implemen-
tation of an effective penetration testing plan can make an investigation cost 
efficient and deliver the best results earlier.
6. Conclusion
Conducting forensic investigations in industrial control systems is a complex 
process, not only because of the diversity of data and media, but also the variety 
of physical and logical partitions that are interconnected to the network including 
name nodes, data nodes and checkpoints. The research has delivered a framework 
for systematizing the process steps of investigation, and assuring the key issues 
of volume, format diversity, and management of data, are addressed. The innova-
tion of featuring penetration testing into the investigation processes provides 
cost efficiencies and targeting towards completeness in an investigation. It steps 
beyond dependence on tool extraction of evidences, and justifies following the 
trail of evidence from the point(s) of greatest weakness and to the evidential media 
within the scope of a case. Such innovation improves assurance of completeness in 
an investigation and rigor for the methodologies. Digital forensic investigators are 
challenged by multimedia retrieval and data diversity. The proposed framework of 
methods is flexible and adaptable to multimedia environments, and assures control 
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